Abstract. Recently, blockchain technology, which adds records to a list using cryptographic links, has been widely applied in the financial field. Therefore, the security of blockchain smart contracts is among the most popular contemporary research topics. To improve the theorem-proving technology in this field, we are developing an extensible hybrid verification tool chain, denoted as FSPVM-E, for Ethereum smart contract verification. This hybrid system extends the Coq proof assistant, a formal proof-management system. Combining symbolic execution with higher-order theorem-proving, it solves consistency, automation, and reusability problems by standard theorem-proving approaches. This article completes the FSPVM-E by developing its proof engine. FSPVM-E is an extensible definitional interpreter based on our previous work FEther, which is totally developed in the Coq proof assistant. It supports almost all semantics of the Solidity programing language, and simultaneously executes multiple types of symbols. FEther also contains a set of automatic strategies that execute and verify the smart contracts in Coq with a high level of automation. The functional correctness of FEther was verified in Coq. The execution efficiency of FEther far exceeded that of the interpreters which are developed in Coq in accordance with the standard tutorial. To our knowledge, FEther is the first definitional interpreter of the Solidity language in Coq.
Introduction 1
Blockchain technology [1] , which adds records to a list using cryptographic links, is among the most popular contemporary technologies. Ethereum is a widely adopted blockchain system that implements a general-purpose, Turing-complete programing language called Solidity [2] . Ethereum enables the development of arbitrary smart contracts that can automate blockchain transactions in a virtual runtime environment, namely, the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Here smart contracts refer to the applications and scripts (i.e., programs) that execute the blockchain. The growing use of smart contracts has necessitated increased scrutiny of their security. Smart contracts can include particular properties (i.e., bugs) that expose them to deliberate attacks causing direct economic loss. Some of the largest attacks on smart contracts are well known, such as the attacks on decentralized autonomous organizations [3] and parity wallet contracts [4] . Many classes of subtle bugs, ranging from transaction-ordering dependencies to mishandled exceptions, exist in smart contracts [5] . Therefore, the security and reliability of smart-contract programs must be verified as rigorously as possible. The properties of programs can be rigorously verified by proving higher-order logic theorems. In the standard approach, a formal model for the target software system is manually abstracted using higher-order theorem-proving assistants. Such formal verification technology provides sufficient freedom and flexibility for designing formal models based on higher-order logic theories, and can abstract and express very complex systems. However, when applied to program verification, the advantages of theorem-proving technology are suppressed by automation, reusability, consistency and efficiency problems.
The above issues can be resolved by a formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) [6] , which directly and symbolically executes real-world smart-contract programs using higher-order theorem-proving assistants. The program's properties are then automatically verified by the execution result. To this end, we are developing an FSPVM named FSPVM-E [7] for smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum platform. FSPVM-E is programed in Coq (a formal proof-management system) and inspired by KLEE, a high-coverage test generator for complex-systems programs [8] . Similarly to [9] , the symbolic execution of FSPVM-E is verified in FEther, a hybrid proof engine that supports multiple types of symbolic execution. FEther, however, is designed for higher-order theorem proving, and its verification process is founded on Hoare [10] and reachability [11] logic. Therefore, the successful implementation of an FSPVM must overcome several challenges [6] .
Some of these challenges have been addressed in our recent studies. In [6] , we noted the lack of a versatile formal memory model for constructing the logic operating environment within a higher-order theorem-proving system. We thus developed a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework based on higher-order logic using Coq [12] . In a later work, we extended the Curry-Howard isomorphism (CHI) [13] to resolve the basic theory of FSPVM. Herein denoted as execution-verification isomorphism (EVI), our solution combines theorem proving and symbolic execution technology. Finally, we developed an extensible large subset of the Solidity programing language, denoted as Lolisa [14] , which equivalently formalizes real-world programing languages as an extensible intermediate programing language.
The present paper completes the FSPVM-E by overcoming the final challenge: developing its proof engine. Our contributions are as follows. First, we develop a definitional interpreter in Coq's specification language (Gallina). This interpreter symbolically executes the smart contracts of Ethereum written in Lolisa on the GERM framework. The execution results are represented by a GERM logic memory state, which can be verified in Coq. Next, we implement a set of automatic evaluation strategies based on the Ltac [12] mechanism, by which FEther finishes the execution and verification process. The correctness of FEther is then certified in Coq. The present FEther is the optimized version with higher evaluation efficiency than the interpreters developed in Coq using standard tutorial approaches. To our knowledge, FEther is the first hybrid proof engine specification that automatically and symbolically executes and verifies Ethereum smart contracts in Coq.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the difference between the FEther and other relevant works. Section 3 introduces the foundations of the present work, including the prototype, the basic environment of Lolisa, and the preparatory modification of the GERM framework. Section 4 describes the theoretical design and implementation of FEther, and its self-correctness certification. Section 5 verifies FEther in a real-world case study and analyzes its benefits. Section 6 discusses the advantages and limitations of FEther. The study concludes with Section 7.
Related Works
The security of smart contracts has been seriously researched since 2015. The security of smart contracts and similar lightweight programs can be rigorously guaranteed by formal methods. Our symbolic executor has several novel features that distinguish it from other approaches. This section introduces the interesting achievements already reported in this field.
The EVM execution is formally described in Yellow Paper [15] . This official document also provides the data, algorithms, and parameters required for building consensus-compatible EVM clients and Ethereum implementations. Yellow Paper, however, does not always clarify the operational behavior of the EVM. In such cases, it is often easier to consult an executable implementation for guidance.
Most of the recent researches have concentrated on EVM security. The C++ implementation Cpp-ethereum plays a dual role of security and defector semantics in EVMs. Lem semantics [16] is a Lem [17] implementation of EVM providing executable semantics of EVM, which formally verifies smart contracts. However, the Lem semantics do not precisely capture the inter-contract execution. KEVM [18] is a formal semantics for EVMs, resembling Lem but written in the K-framework. As KEVM is executable, it can run the validation test suite provided by the Ethereum foundation. According to the authors of [18] , the KEVM reference interpreter passes the full 40,683-test EVM compliance suite. Nevertheless, self-correctness cannot be proven completely or even certified in KEVM. Moreover, none of the above approaches satisfies the de Bruijn criterion [19] .
Mythril [20] is a security analysis tool for Ethereum smart contracts. Mythril detects various problems by concolic analysis, but whether the tool effectively increases the reliability of smart contracts has not been proven.
The above researches adopt the bytecode of Solidity. The consistency between Solidity and bytecode after compiling cannot be guaranteed. However, high-level formal specifications and relevant formal verification tools of Solidity, which are important for programing and debugging smart contract software, have received little attention.
Finally, some of these works focus on a specific domain. Their complex architecture is inflexible and not easily extendible to new relevant problems.
Foundational Concepts
The present paper builds upon our recent previous works. Therefore, prior to defining the formal specifications of FEther, we first define the basic environment.
Predefinitions
Previously, we constructed a prototype of our FSPVM framework, which extends the proof assistants as a hybrid system combining symbolic execution and higher-order theorem proving. This prototype solves consistency, automation, and reusability problems in standard theorem-proving approaches. The prototype, which is the blueprint of FSPVM-E, consists of the following two parts.
The first step combines symbolic execution and higher-order theorem-proving, and simulates the execution of real-world programs. The prototype is verified by solving the consistency, automation, and reusability problems of higher-order theorem-proving. The blueprint (denoted as FSPVM) extends the higher-order theorem-proving assistants that support CHI.
Specifically, we extend CHI to EVI, which operates under Principles 1 and 2 below:
verifications correspond to proofs (1) .
verifications correspond to execution of programs (2) .
FSPVM also contains a formal general memory model ℱℳ and a formal intermediate language ℱℒ (equivalent to the respective general-purpose programing language ℒ), for rewriting the formal versions of RWprogram as FRWprogram. It also requires a formally verified interpreter (FInterpreter), which plays the roles of the execution-engine core in the FSPVM (i.e., simulating the real execution process of FRWprograms and generating the logic memory states; see Figure 1 ). The executable semantics of ℱℒ provide the instruction set architecture (ISA) of FInterpreter. Currently, we are developing a specified extensible verified FSPVM in Coq for Ethereum smart-contracts verification, denoted as FSPVM-E. In FSPVM-E, the ℱℳ and ℱℒ are the GERM framework and the Lolisa programing language, respectively. 
GERM
The GERM is a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory framework. It simultaneously supports different formal verification specifications, particularly at the code level. This framework simulates the physical memory hardware structure, including a low-level formal memory space, and provides a set of simple, nonintrusive application programing interfaces (APIs).
The proposed GERM framework is independent and customizable, and was verified entirely in Coq. Initialize the entire memory space Table 1 . Basic memory-management APIs employed in the formal memory model. Table 2 summarizes the helper states used in the dynamic semantic definitions, and Table 3 lists the helper functions for calculating commonly needed values in the current program state. All of these state functions will be encountered in the following discussion. The components of specific states will be denoted by appropriate Greek letters subscripted by the state of interest. In Table 2 , , , and ℰ denote the contexts of the formal memory space, a specific memory state, and the execution environment, respectively. The proof evaluation is executed in the proof contexts, denoted as , 1 , … For brevity, we hereafter represent the overall formal system by ℱ, the current execution environment by , and the super-environment of type env by .
In the following sections, we introduce the relevant analysis and solutions that improve the computation efficiency of ℱℐ in higher-order theorem-proving assistants. To avoid infinite loops in the programs, FSPVM also imports bounded model checking (BMC) [22] . Fortunately, the EVM does not support infinite execution processes, as each execution step costs the gas of the smart contract owners. If the gas balance cannot satisfy the limitation, the execution terminates. This design well suits the BMC concept. Therefore, our implementation uses gas to limit the execution of the Solidity programs.
In the following contents, we represent other arguments by the wildcard " * " and by the symbol {| * ⟼ * |} . is the syntax of constructor pattern matching of the -expression [23] . To avoid ambiguity in the following discussion of FEther, the functions represent the programs and functions written in Gallina, and RWprogram represents the real-world programs written in general-purpose programing languages.
Modifications for optimization
As mentioned previously, when analyzing the current problems, the computational efficiency of the definitional interpreter based on the FSPVM may be extremely low. The three essential problems are call-by-name termination (CBNT), information redundancy explosion (IRE), and concurrent reduction (CR). To optimize the low-level computations of the evaluation problems, we incorporate the respective solutions in [25] into the implementation details of FEther.
First, the sequence statement s is implicitly replaced by an equivalent list rather than explicitly defined, which avoids the CBNT problem. Second, the pattern matchings and reusable functions are encapsulated as optimization helper functions. Some of these functions are summarized in Table 4 . To avoid the CR problem, we finally impose a limitation K (independent of the gas constraint) on the expression and value layers. Table 4 . Encapsulation functions in the optimized FEther
FEther Implementation
FEther is the bridge that connects the GERM framework, the Lolisa programing language, and the trusted core of Coq (TCOC). As demonstrated in our previous work and elaborated in the following subsections, FEther can be totally built in Coq. Figure 2 shows the overall structure of the FEther framework. The whole FEther is constructed in the trusted domain of Coq, and logically comprises three main components: a parser, an ISA based on Lolisa semantics, and a validation checking mechanism (see left, center and right blocks in Figure. 2, respectively). The parser analyzes the syntax of the FRWprograms written in Lolisa.
Architecture
According to EVI theory, FEther is essentially a huge function written in Gallina. In this sense, it differs from the real-world virtual machines of high-level programing languages such as Smalltalk, Java, and .Net, which support bytecode as their ISA and are implemented by translating the bytecodes of commonly used code paths into native machine code. Instead, the ISA of FEther comprises the Lolisa semantics, which specify the semantics of the syntax tokens that govern the respective behaviors. The validation checking mechanism includes two parts: checking the result validation (including the memory states and values), and checking the execution condition. First, because all functions are vulnerable to undefined situations, they are developed with the help of effect programing. More specifically, all functions are tagged by an optional type. A valid result is returned in the form Some t; an invalid result is returned as an undefined value None. The symbol ⟦ ⟧ denotes that term t is tagged by an optional type.
In the second part, the gas and K limitations are validated by the helper functions ℎ and ℎ , respectively.
FEther inherits the low-coupling property from Lolisa. Within the same level, the executable semantics are wholly independent, and are encapsulated as modules connected by a set of interfaces. In different levels, the higher-level semantics can access the lower-level semantics only via the interfaces, and the implementation details of the lower-level semantics are transparent to the higher-level semantics (indicated by dotted lines in Figure 2 ). Moreover, the implementation of the higher-level semantics does not depend on the lower-level semantics.
Figure 2. Architecture of FEther
The workflow of FEther is outlined in Figure 3 . 
Posconditons
initializing the formal memory space of GERM and applying the translator. Note that the translator is an optional auxiliary component, which translates the Solidity programs into the FRWprograms written in Lolisa. To this end, it searches the abstract syntax tree of Lolisa, binds the variable identifiers with a unique memory address, and declares the ML modules. This process can also be completed manually. Because the translator is part of FSPVM-E rather than a core component of FEther, it is not further discussed in this paper. Next, the FEther parser analyzes the FRWprograms according to the Lolisa abstract syntax tree, and invokes the respective executable semantics. The TCOC handles the evaluation requirements, and the results are validated by the validation mechanism. Although the validation module is logically independent of the other parts (as mentioned above), it is implemented separately in the Formal Interpreter and Formal Semantic modules in real cases. Therefore, the validation module is not explicitly defined in Figure 3 . The final formal memory state will be assumed in the property theorems.
Lolisa is defined by GADT, which guarantees well-formed constructions of the syntax specifications. Thus, the side conditions of syntax correctness do not need checking by help functions defined in FEther. The type safety can be checked by the type-checking mechanism of Coq. The complete workload of constructing an FEther framework with 100 memory blocks is itemized in Table 5 . Table 5 . Workload statistics for constructing the FEther framework with 100 memory blocks.
ISA of FEther
The ISA of FEther is the core of the proof engine, which follows the big-step operational semantics of Lolisa. As shown in Figure 2 , the FEther ISA is separated into three layers. FEther is implemented as described in Appendix A.
Value layer
This project aims to formalize a mechanized syntax and semantics for a subset of the Solidity language, which can be directly executed and verified in higher-order logic theorem-proving assistants. Therefore, the Solidity values must be evaluated like the native values in the formal system. Ideally, the values of Solidity or some mainstream high-level programing language would be explicitly employed in the formal system. Due to the strict typing system of the trusted core and the adoption of different paradigms, however, Gallina (Coq) does not directly support array, mapping, and other complex values. Therefore, we must define an interlayer between the values of the real-world language and the native values of the formal system. This interlayer directly represents the real world-values by an equivalent syntax, and translates them into the native values using formal semantics.
After evaluating the Lolisa value by formal executable semantics, the native value information is computed or derived in the base formal system, and the respective GERM memory values are determined. In the following sections, ℰ represents the Translator ℱ entry point of calling the value semantics, which is abstractedly defined by Rule 3 below. . The computational semantics of ( ) are defined by Rule 4. We then define ℰ ( ,
The computational semantics ℰ are summarized in Table A .1 of A. The correctness of ℰ is certified by Theorem 1 (the constant-mapping theorem).
Theorem 1 (Constant mapping) For all Lolisa values
( ), environment values env, and block information , the
We then define the semantics of the reference values (the array, mapping, structure and field access values), which are needed for accessing the formal memory space and match indexes. The respective values are defined as follows, and the semantics ℰ of the array values are defined in Table A .2 of A. Here, ℎ is a subsidiary function. Because the Lolisa language supports an n-dimensional array (by Rule 6), ℎ is a special subsidiary function that searches the memory block indexed by the current n-dimensional array index.
ℎ is also used in the function. Below we introduce the specific implementations of ℎ . The abstract function of ℎ implementations is given by Rule 5.
The mapping value is stored as a singly linked list structure in the GERM memory model, and in the form :
in Lolisa. In the above expression, the first parameter stores the initial address, the second parameter stores the paired key and indexed values, the third and fourth parameters record the key value and indexed value types, respectively, and the fifth parameter represents the next address. The Map can be briefly abstracted as Figure 4 . In this design, the structure supports the n-dimensional mapping datatype. For instance, consider the 2-dimensional mapping datatype
in Figure 5 . Each memory block in one dimension is the initial block of a respective mapping list in two dimensions. The n-dimensional mapping type in Lolisa can be defined by the same process. Obviously, the function can be implemented by any singly linked list-search algorithm. If the search is successful, the function returns ; otherwise, it returns (see Table A .3 in A). At the value level, a Struct memory value is represented by a struct datatype. Therefore, it resembles a normal-form value, and can be extracted directly by ℎ (see Table A .4 of A).
The Solidity semantics of field access are very complex and consist of two parts: a contract member access and a struct field access. If the contract member access derives from an inheritance relationship or a special identifier, such as the keyword "this", it can be accessed directly through the ML module system. Briefly, the module scope of each function and contract is defined by the translator, and can be accessed by the ML module system provided by Coq. If the contract member access derives from a variable, the contract information stored in the respective memory block is searched, and the identified member is accessed by the field access mechanism of the Coq built-in ML module system. The struct field access semantics are supported by Lolisa. The built-in EVM functions in a standard structure, such as msg or block, are of no concern because they are already defined in the Lolisa standard library [14] . Therefore, they can be treated as normal structures in the semantics. 
Expression Layer
The executable semantics of expressions are the rules that acquire the results of the value layer and evaluate the Lolisa expression in the memory value of GERM. The evaluation requires the left-value (l-value) and right-value positions, representing the memory addresses and the specific memory value, respectively. In the following contents, the entered pointer of the expression layer ℰ is defined by Rules 7 and 8.
In formal Lolisa semantics, the modifier expression is a special one that cannot be evaluated in the expression layer (as will be later explained in the statement semantics). The computational semantics are defined as follows:
Expressions in the l-value position:
The following rules define the semantics of evaluating the expressions in the l-value position (i.e., the respective memory address). The expressions in the l-value position, which can be constructed by the Econst constructor, 
Expressions in the r-value position:
The following functions describe the semantics of evaluating expressions in the r-value position (i.e., the respective memory values). The evaluation of constant expressions is given in Table A .10 of A. Assisted by ℰ , the ℰ directly provides the respective memory value.
According to Convention 1, the struct constructor Estruct represents an expression value at the right position, which is the only way to initialize or modify struct-type terms. The semantics of the right struct value are defined in Finally, the semantics of the binary and unary operations are defined in Tables A.13 
Statement Layer
Having defined the semantics, we can now define the statement layer. Statement semantics parse the FRWprograms written by Lolisa, and evaluate the new memory states. The semantics of the sequence statements are not explicitly defined, and the relevant statement definitions are modified to improve the extremely low computational efficiency of solving the CBNT problem.
We express the evaluation process of a statement as ℰ , and give its abstract definition as Rule 9.
Most statement evaluations employ the helper function ℎ , which takes the current environment env and the super-environment fenv as arguments, and checks the conditions (gas limitation and execution-level validity) 
Second, the initial contract information, including all member identifiers, is written into a designated memory block by the assistant function . The formal semantics of the contract declaration are defined in Table A .15 of A.
Variable declaration is a basic task in Lolisa. The function is a special case of , with type given by Rule 11.
This function takes the current memory state, variable type, indexed address, and environment information as parameters, and initializes the respective memory block. Being based on the GERM memory model, the initialization and location processes of this term with the array datatype differ from those in standard researches on formalizing array types. The function calls the function to initialize the respective terms.
In Yang et al. [14] , normal types are datatypes whose typing rules disallow recursive definition. A normal type is assigned as . 
The full tree structure of this array is given in Figure 6 , and the mathematical evaluation process is shown as follows: Figure 7 shows the initialization process of Figure  7 ). To allocate the memory blocks of the third dimension, continues the deep recursion in Steps (4) and (5) Step (4) of Figure 7 ). Steps (6)- (8) Figure 8 . Here, the left column (9) is the real structure and the right column (10) is the group classification. than searching each group, its core procedure is 
: if ∈ ∧ < , then move to , else return ;
After running this algorithm, the symbolic execution in FEther more accurately simulates the initialization and allocation behavior of an n-dimensional array in real hardware than other formalizations using the list datatype. An array can be abstracted by a number of interesting algorithms, such as tree structure mapping [26] or graphic mapping [27] , but the advantages of these algorithms are partially offset by disadvantages. For example, although they can represent an infinite memory space, their specifications and formal structures are very complex and difficult to extend. Moreover, to modify an array element, an operation must search each node one by one, and the overflow problem is difficult to check without a dependent type. In an algorithm based on the GERM memory model, the array is stored in a fixed-size contiguous memory space without assistance by a dependent type [28] . Verifiers can formally simulate the address offsetting process, check the array overflow problem by checking the head Flag stored in the memory block, and modify an array block directly by indexing the respective memory address. Consequently, the verification process becomes easier and more accurate.
Assuming that the current logic context based on GERM has sufficient logic memory space, and that each identifier has a valid and free address, represents the first time of setting the indexed memory block, and is always successful.
The variable declaration semantics in this scenario are defined in Table A .16 of A.
The semantics of the structure datatype declaration are defined in Table A .17 of A. By Convention 1, the structure declaration at the statement level declares a new structure type with address identifier . The field member list of is . As an example, Figure 9 defines the built-in address datatype of Solidity rewritten by Lolisa. The _0xaddress is the , and the remaining fields are the . The ℰ records the struct type information directly into the memory block with address TInt (Nvar gas) ( ))))) _0xaddress 2 occupy) Figure 9 . Address type declaration in Solidity, and its equivalent special struct type in Lolisa syntax
In Lolisa, a function call statement unfolds the function body stored in the respective memory address. The semantics of a function call ℰ are given in Table A .18 of A. In the first step, the function call attempts to read the function declaration statements stored in the respective memory address. If the readout is successful, the second step sets the current execution environment level to 0, and (with the assistance of ) sets the domain as the called function identifier. In the final step, the function body is executed with the new nv'. Modifier declarations are special function declarations requiring three steps, and including a single limitation. The parameter values are set by the predicate. As defined by Table A .21 in A, the first step initializes and sets the parameters. The second step stores the modifier body into the respective memory block, and the third step attempts to initialize the return address .
Under the rules of Solidity, the modifier body can return the checking flag, but cannot change the memory states. Therefore, in
FEther, we add a special Boolean-type memory block in the GERM framework, indexed by _0xmodifer. If the modifier checking is successful, the block is set to true and assigned as ; otherwise, it is set to false and assigned as , meaning that other blocks cannot be modified.
To guarantee the type safety, Lolisa separately defines the single-and multi-return value functions. As shown in Table A.22 of A, however, we combine them such that the return type and modifier limitation are both defined as lists. The conditional-statement semantics (see Table A Tables 25 and 26 of A, respectively.
Finally, Table A .27 of A defines the skip statement Snil (which prohibits changes in the skipped part), the throw statement Throw (a special kind of Solidity statement that stops the current program and sets the memory state as ), and the function stop statement FunStop (a conventional Lolisa statement that represents the completed execution of all statements in the function bodies with no return statements, and resets the current environment).
The FEther Parser
To analyze the syntactic units of FRWprograms, the semantics must be integrated into a parser that is easily implemented on the ISA. As shown in Figure 2 , the parser has three layers for parsing the three syntax layers. The functions of these layers are validating the environment, deconstructing the input syntactic units, mapping the syntactic units into the respective semantics ℰ , and transmitting the information stored in the to the ℰ . As an example, consider the value layer in Table 6 . First, the ℰ checks the K limitation. It then deconstructs the input value into specific constructors by pattern matching. Finally, the logic data are transmitted into their respective semantics.
Therefore, the parsers can be summarized as the typing judgements 16 and 17, where denotes the validation process. 
The rules governing the execution of a Lolisa program in FEther are defined by the rules EXE-F and EXE-IF below, where the symbol ∞ refers to infinite execution, and T is the termination condition set of a finite execution.
,
Automation tactics
Automated theorem proving is a core topic in formal verification research. Many higher-order theorem-proving assistants provide tactics or similar mechanisms that simplify the program evaluation process and construct proofs automatically. With manual modeling technology, different formal models with significantly different structures and verification processes can be constructed in various programs. Hence, designing a set of tactics that automatically verifies models in different programs is nearly impossible.
The above problem is circumvented by FEther. According to EVI theory, the FEther symbolic execution corresponds to both the function evaluation and the program verification (see Rule 18) . In other words, it unifies the verification processes of different programs in higher-order theorem-proving assistants by simplifying the program evaluation process in FEther. Because the situations of FEther execution constitute a fixed and finite set { 0 , 1 , … , }, we can design sufficiently many sub-tactics for all situations. Exploiting this advantage and assisted by the Ltac mechanism, we designed primitive automatic tactics for the FEther.
The tactic strategy model is constructed from three parts: memory operating, K costing and semantics simplifying.
The workflow is defined in Figure 10 . The average ratios of contract size to proof size are shown in Table 7 . Smart contracts exceeding 500 lines were excluded from this analysis, because the size of large contracts were limited by the gas cost. The second and third columns of Table 7 list the ratios using Coq's built-in tactics and our automatic tactics, respectively. Obviously, the automatic tactics reduce much of the proof workload. Moreover, according to our experimental results, the ratio floats in a range is influenced by the complexity of the target contract. Specifically, the ratios obtained by the built-in tactics range from approximately −0. to + 0.0, whereas those of the automatic tactics range from approximately −0. to + 0.3. Therefore, the automatic tactics possess a better universal property than the directly applied built-in tactics. Table 7 . Ratios of proof size to contract size in theorem-proving tactics
Self-correctness Certification
The FEther interpreter is entirely constructed in Coq, which confers a natural advantage over other program verifications and analysis tools. The core of Coq is the trusted computation base (TCB) [24] , which satisfies the de Bruijn criterion. In almost all program analysis tools, TCB self-verification is arguable and paradoxical, so whether the TCB of a program verification (analysis) tool satisfies the de Bruijn criterion is an important indicator of the trustworthiness of the verification.
The correctness of FEther is certified by its consistency between the relational and computational definitions, the correctness of its essential properties, and the meta-properties of its semantics.
First, we must prove that the operational semantics [30] of Lolisa (the inductive relational forms) are equivalent to the operational semantics (the executable function forms). As desired in the CompCert project [26] , we check whether each evaluation in the relation semantics corresponds to the symbolic execution in the executable semantics. For this purpose, we construct a simulation diagram. Under identical conditions, the relational and executable semantics must have the same observable effect (same traces of the evaluation process). This requirement is embodied in the following simulation diagram theory.
be the initial evaluation environment, and let represent the equivalence relationship between two terms. Then, any relational semantic and executable semantic must satisfy the following simulation diagram:
Second, we must certify the correctness of the foundation behavior of the executable semantics. As a simple instance, we construct Lemma test_lemma_if_false, which certifies the correctness of the following execution: For all statements and ′, if the if statement condition is false, FEther must execute the statement ′ of the false branch. By a similar process, we certified that almost all of the executable semantics exhibit standard behaviors.
Finally, we prove the meta-properties of these semantics. The most basic properties in each layer are the progress and preservation properties, which maintain the static-type safety of the specification. For example, the progress and preservation of the expression layer are defined in Lemma expression type safety. Because Lolisa is a strongly typed language defined in terms of GADTs, the progress and preservation properties of expressions are easily proven by simplifying the semantics function. The progress and preservation properties of other layers are certified similarly. Besides the meta-properties, we proved the execution
determinism of all semantics in Coq. The Lemma execution determinism is one example of the relevant proofs.
Lemma (expression type safety) 1. If : and ⟼ , then ′:
If :
, then either ( ) or some exists such that ⟼ .
At present, the core functions have been completely verified. The correctness certification includes 74 theorems and lemmas, and approximately 4000 lines of Coq proof code.
Formal verification of smart contract by FEther
To demonstrate the power of FEther in real-world practice, this section verifies the smart contract in a case study that demonstrates our proof engine and its benefits. The experimental environment was five identical personal computers with equivalent hardware of 8 GB memory and a 3.20 GHz CPU. All computers were run on Windows 10 and CoqIDE 8.8. For readers' benefit, the code of the examples is given in Appendix B.
Case Study: Hybrid Verification
As a simple example, we consider the wallet function encoded in Appendix B. This function, which executes initial coin offering, is a segment of the Solidity contract extracted from the contract demonstration [2] .
First, the smart contract in its formal version was translated line-byline into Lolisa. The result is shown in Figure 11 . Among the most important functions of wallet is the application time validation. Clearly, the contract will be discarded if the current time now are below privilegeOpen or above privilegeClose. Figure 11 . Formal version of the wallet function According to EVI theory, verification in the proposed FSPVM is founded on simultaneous Hoare logic and reachability logic.
Meanwhile, verification in FEther combines higher-order theorem proving and symbolic execution. By virtue of this hybrid system, programmers can mechanically define the Hoare style properties following the formula abstract (19) , where the wildcard "*"represents other specific arguments. P{m init } FEther(m init , FRWprograms, * ) Q{m final }.
According to the reachability logic, the Hoare logic derivation is equivalent to the trusted operational semantics execution.
Therefore, the execution of FEther can be seen as a derivation based on Hoare logic. The inference process is given by expression (20) . Second, FEther supports concolic symbolic execution that gets real inputs. To accurately simulate execution processes on real world hardware, FEther is built in a virtual execution environment. Therefore, a FEther execution can be regarded as a special dynamic analysis. As shown in Figure 14 , the entering points test and code wallet are unmodified, and privilegeOpen, proviledgeClose and now are replaced with specific values 0, 3, and 4, respectively. The other constraints are still inductively defined as abstract symbols. The function correctness of concolic execution with specific inputs is then proven by the no_in_time lemma. Because the inputs are specified, the number of possible execution paths is limited, and the execution time reduces to 1.689 s (see Figure 15 ). Of course, to test the function of wallet within a special test suite, programmers can write an automatic test script that modifies the values of privilegeOpen, proviledgeClose and now. Under the composition rule of Hoare logic, we have P{m init }c 0 ↠ c n Q{m final }. In this way, simple loops can be proven automatically, reducing the workload of searching loop invariants. Moreover, complex loops that cannot be verified by model checking and symbolic execution technology can be proved by higher-order theorem-proving technology.
Finally, the FEther provides a debug mechanism for users. Because FEther is developed in the GERM memory model, it provides debug tactics such as step, which enables step-by-step debugging of a smart contract. The formal intermediate memory 
Feature Comparison Overview
FEther is the first hybrid symbolic execution engine for Ethereum smart contracts. To illustrate the advantages of FEther over the solvers of other tools, we require a compelling benchmark, such as a testing suite or analysis time. Given that FEther is constructed on Coq, however, and directly executes and verifies the Solidity source code of smart contracts rather than compiling Solidity at the bytecode level, such a benchmark is difficult to find. Table 8 overviews the results of the feature comparison. Obviously, only FEther, the core of KEVM, and Mythril support the Spec, Exec, Verif, Debug, and Gas features. The Certif feature of FEther is "verifying" rather than "testing," which improves the reliability of FEther (at least in theory) over testing methods such as KEVM and Mythril. Moreover, the execution and verification level of FEther is "Solidity" rather than "byte code," which avoids the error risk during compiling. FEther also supports higher-order logic, which improves the expressive ability. Moreover, the fundamental verification theory of FEther is the calculus of inductive construction instead of the satisfiability modulo theories or Boolean satisfiability problem. Therefore, the situations that cannot be evaluated and verified do not exist. Finally, FEther is the only tool that supports hybrid formal verification.
According to our previous experimental results [25] , the symbolic execution time of the optimized current version of FEther is approximately 0.03 s per statement when the initial arguments are specified, and approximately 0.07 s when the initial arguments are inductively defined by quantifiers. The execution efficiency of FEther far exceeded that of the interpreters that are developed in Coq in accordance with the standard tutorial developed in Coq. The current version also supports the verification of smart contract models adhering to the Ethereum ERC20 standard.
Discussion

A. Contributions
This article overcomes the final challenge noted in our previous work: completing the proof engine of FSPVM-E. We now highlight the significant contributions of the present work. First, we confirmed that FEther maintains consistency between the Solidity source code and the respective formal specifications. To our knowledge, FEther is the first proof engine of Ethereum that supports the hybrid verification technology of Coq. Second, it provides a debug mechanism by which programmers can directly debug target smart contracts in Coq. Third, the correctness of FEther has been completely certified in Coq, implying that FEther is a reliable proof engine. Fourth, we provided a proprietary set of automatic tactics for FEther, which will help programmers to finish their property verifications with a high degree of automation. Finally, we optimized the high-level evaluation efficiency of FEther. We confirmed the utility of our previous works in building a certified executable proof engine in Coq.
B. Extensibility and Universality
Obviously, the definitional interpreter of an intermediate must faithfully capture the intended behaviors of programs written in real-world programing languages. From a flexibility perspective, the same interpreter should also be applicable to multiple programing languages. Therefore, extensibility and universality were considered in the FEther design from the beginning of its development.
As mentioned in [14] , we deliberately incorporated extensible space in Lolisa. This space is sufficient for expanding features This method assigns each ℒ with a respective notation set that satisfies ⊆ . This relation, defined by Rule 23 below, also improves the extendibility of Lolisa.
As the respective definitional interpreter of Lolisa, FEther inherits the extensibility advantages of Lolisa, and supports all of its syntaxes and semantics. Moreover, at the same level, any executable semantic is independent of any other semantic, and all same-level semantics are encapsulated into an independent module ℳ (see Rules 24 and 25 below). Higher-level semantics can access the APIs of lower-level semantics in different ℳs, but the implementation details are transparent among the levels.
Therefore, as shown in Figure 18 , FEther is also easily extendible to new executable semantics in Lolisa without affecting the old semantics. Figure 18 . Detailed architecture for extending Lolisa to other general-purpose programing languages.
C. Limitations
Although the novel features in the current version of FEther confer many advantages, some limitations remain.
First, the FEther operates at the Solidity source-code level. Although it will not import vulnerabilities in the compiling process, it cannot guarantee the correctness of the bytecode when the compiler is untrusted. One possible solution is developing a low-level version of FEther that executes the bytecode generated by the compilation. One must then prove equivalence between the Solidity execution results and the respective execution results of the bytecode.
Second, similar to other symbolic execution tools, the FEther traverses all possible execution paths, which risks the path explosion problem. Given that Ethereum smart contracts are lightweight or even featherweight programs, however, the path explosion problem is almost precluded. Moreover, in situations that do meet the path explosion problem, the executions can be merged as invariants by the theorem-proving technology, and proven manually. This solution would exploit the selective symbolic execution pattern of FEther.
Finally, although the current version of FEther achieves property verifications by a few simple automatic tactics, it is not yet fully automated. In occasional situations, programmers must analyze the current proof goal and choose suitable verification tactics.
Fortunately, this goal can be achieved by optimizing the design of the tactic evaluation strategies.
Conclusions and future work
This paper tackled the final challenge of the FSPVM blueprint: developing a definitional interpreter in Coq. The interpreter, Finally, we discussed the extensibility and universality of FEther, and proposed an initial scheme for systematically simplifying We hope that FSPVM-E will become sufficiently powerful and user-friendly for easy program verification by general programmers. Currently we are formalizing higher-level smart-contract development languages of the EOS blockchain platform [29] . We are also aiming to extend and optimize the current version of FEther. Future versions will support the assembly language of Solidity. Next, we will extend the FSPVM-E to support the Ethereum and EOS simultaneously. A formal verified interpreter of these languages will be developed based on the GERM platform. We will then build a general formal verification toolchain for blockchain smart contracts based on the EVI. Finally, we will build a general formal verification toolchain for blockchain smart contracts based on EVI, with the ultimate goal of automatic smart-contract verification. 
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